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St£sij-theory in Homeric commentary 
Malcolm Heath 
University of Leeds 
ABSTRACT: (i) Analysis of the small number of references to the rhetorical 
theory of stasis (issue-theory) in the Homeric scholia shows that they assume a 
modified version of the theory of Athenaeus, a contemporary and rival of 
Hermagoras of Temnos. (ii) In his discussion of Agamemnon's speech in Iliad 
3.456-60 Eustathius follows the discussion in Plutarch Quaestiones convivales 
9.13, rather than that in the scholia. It is shown that this is justified on technical 
grounds. The interpretation in the scholia does not fit Agamemnon's speech, and 
must have originated in a discussion of the attested Homeric 'problem' 
concerning claims that the Trojans had broken their oath. 
I 
The sporadic references to st£sij-theory in the scholia to the Iliad employ an 
unusual terminology.
1
 The following terms are found:  
(A1) parormhtik» (9.228; 23.594);  
(A2) katastocastik» (18.497-8);  
(A3) ¢lloiwtik» (1.118; 8.424; 9.228, 312-3), of which tÕ ØpallaktikÒn is a 
part (9.228);  
(A4) dikaiologik» (23.594);2 
(A5) ·htÕn kaˆ di£noia (3.457).  
Of these, A2 is a recognisable variant on the standard term conjecture 
(stocasmÒj); A4 is common; A5 is standard. But A1 and both items of A3 are less 
familiar. Is it possible to identify their provenance?  
There is no exact parallel to this range of terms, but there are some apparently 
unique points of contact with the system of Athenaeus, a rhetorician of the second 
century BC (cf. Quintilian 3.1.16, Hermagoras, cui maxime par et aemulus 
videtur Athenaeus fuisse).
3
 According to Quintilian (3.6.47), Athenaeus recognised 
four st£seij:  
(B1) protreptik» or parormhtik»  
(B2) suntelik»  
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(B3) Øpallaktik» 
(B4) dikaiologik»  
All four elements in this scheme can be mapped onto elements of the scheme 
used in the scholia: 
(B1) Quintilian describes this st£sij as exhortativum; it corresponds directly 
to A1. There seems to be no other instance of parormhtik» as the name of a 
st£sij. Athenaeus scheme is unique among those in Quintilians survey in giving 
a place to deliberative oratory among the primary st£seij.4 
(B2) Quintilian identifies the suntelik¾ st£sij as conjecture, but notes that 
the name is less than transparent. In Stoic grammar suntelikÒj designates 
perfective aspect;
5
 this seems to be the most likely derivation of Athenaeus term 
for conjecture, the quaestio facti. In A2 it receives a less exotic, although still non-
standard, name.  
(B3) Quintilian identifies the Øpallaktik¾ st£sij with what in standard 
terminology is called definition: mutatione enim nominis constat. Cognate forms 
are occasionally used (without reference to st£sij-theory) in the Homer scholia 
for the replacement of one word with a semantically related word of different 
evaluative import; e.g. at Il. 9.109-10: dexiîj Øp»llaxe t¦ ÑnÒmata, t¾n 
aÙq£deian megalofrosÚnhn kalîn (cf. 4.321, 15.52, 22.56-7); and Cicero 
reports a rhetorical use of Øpallag» as equivalent to the grammarians 
metwnum…a (Orator 93). Athenaeus presumably saw an analogy to this trope in the 
strategy of argument in which the speaker takes something which his audience has 
hitherto considered under one description and asks them to consider it under a 
different description. This interpretation fits all the occurrences of the ¢lloiwtik¾ 
st£sij in the Homer scholia:  
(i) At Il. 1.118 Agamemnon demands a gšraj: ¢lloiwtikÍ st£sei kšcrhtai, 
metatiqeˆj t¦ ÑnÒmata [n.b.] prÕj kÒsmon ˜autoà. This cryptic observation is 
illuminated by the note on Achilles filokteanètate at 1.122: oÙ g¦r gšrwj 
'Agamšmnwn, ¢ll¦ kšrdouj ¢ntipoie‹tai. In other words, Agamemnon is seen 
as defending himself against an (implied or anticipated) criticism of his greed by 
offering an alternative characterisation of his motives.  
(ii) At Il. 8.424 Iris asks Hera whether she will dare to raise her spear DiÕj 
¥nta: kaˆ ¹ mān (Hera) kaq' “Ektoroj Ðrm´, ¹ dā (Iris) ¢lloiwtikÍ st£sei 
crwmšnh kat¦ DiÒj fhsin poleme‹n. The point is that Iris tries to deter 
(™kdeimatoàsa) Hera by encouraging her to think of her sortie against Hector as 
instead an attack on Zeus.  
                                                 
4
 Hermagoras, according to Cic. Inv. 1.10-12 and Quint. 3.6.56, made deliberative questions a 
species of the st£sij of quality; this is the place they have also in the later Hermogenean system. 
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5
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(iii) Odysseus speech to Achilles at Il. 9.225-306 is divided between two 
st£seij, the parormhtik» and the ¢lloiwtik» (9.228); the latter is introduced 
when Odysseus urges Achilles to act out of pity for the rest of the Greeks even if 
he remains angry with Agamemnon (™pˆ t¾n deutšran dā metabšbhke st£sin 
9.300, cf. 9.316). Thus Odysseus seeks to shift the basis of the discussion by 
asking Achilles to see the situation in terms of his relations with the other Greeks 
rather than of his relations with Agamemnon. In 9.312-3 it is suggested that this 
use of the ¢lloiwtik¾ st£sij is the target of Achilles reference to those who 
think one thing and say another; the insinuation is, presumably, that for Odysseus 
the appeal to Achilles pity for the other Greeks is simply an oblique or disguised 




We may conclude, then, that the ¢lloiwtik¾ st£sij of the scholia (A3) 
corresponds to Athenaeus Øpallaktik¾ st£sij (B3). Two further suggestions 
may be advanced more tentatively:  
(a) Ciceros equation of Øpallag» with metwnum…a is exceptional; this usage 
is therefore likely to have become extinct in or shortly after Ciceros time.
7
 In later 
rhetoric the term is applied to the (related, but not identical) figure of ™pit…mhsij, 
in which a word is used and then corrected (as in Demosthenes 18.130 Ñyā g£r 
pote—Ñyā lšgw; cqāj mān oân kaˆ prèhn: see, e.g., Alexander De Figuris 
3.40.21f. Spengel). The term ¢llo…wsij is associated with Caecilius of Calacte 
(fr. 75 Ofenloch = Tiberius De Figuris 3.80.18ff. Spengel).
8
 His application of the 
term to a range of primarily grammatical figures is not, at first sight, very relevant; 
but it intersects with Ciceros Øpallag» in one instance, the metonymic use of the 
name of a country for its inhabitants.
9
 It is possible, therefore, that the renaming of 
Athenaeus Øpallaktik¾ st£sij as ¢lloiwtik» reflects Caecilius influence. 
However, there is no sign that Caecilius scheme of st£seij, which was quite 
differently structured from that of Athenaeus (fr. 6 = Quintilian 3.6.48), has been 
at work here; so the terminological change provides no more than additional 
testimony to the already well-attested influence of Caecilius work on figures.  
(b) One scholion (9.228) identifies tÕ ØpallaktikÒn as an unspecified part 
of the ¢lloiwtik¾ st£sij. This suggests a possible explanation for Quintilians 
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report that some identified Athenaeus Øpallaktik¾ st£sij as met£lhyij 
(3.6.48): if Athenaeus Øpallaktik¾ st£sij included any attempt to shift the 
basis of an argument (either by redefining the act in question, or by challenging 
the validity of the proceedings), the follower who substituted ¢lloiwtik» for 
Øpallaktik» in the generic sense may have retained the latter term for the 
procedural species. There seems to be no other instance of Øpallaktik» as a term 
in st£sij-theory.  
(B4) That Athenaeus used the term dikaiologik» is inferred from Quintilian 
(iuridicalem, eadem appelatione Graeca qua ceteri usus, 3.6.47 with 3.6.33); it 
corresponds directly to A4.  
This leaves A5. Although no separate mention of the nomikaˆ st£seij is 
made in Quintilians report on Athenaeus, he can hardly have ignored them. One 
possibility is that he counted them as branches of B4, which will in that case 
subsume A5 as well. However, because ·htÕn kaˆ di£noia is so standard a term 
in st£sij-theory there is no guarantee that the note in question (3.457) has the 
same source as the other, more distinctive scholia on st£sij. I discuss this note 
further in (II) below.  
It seems, therefore, that the scheme of st£seij applied in the Homer scholia 
is substantially that of Athenaeus. Two structural features point to this conclusion: 
the recognition of a deliberative st£sij (A1 = B1); and the conception of a 
st£sij, taking the place of the standard st£sij of definition, analogous to 
metonymy and/or related tropes (A3 = B3). The coincidence of two terms 
(parormhtik», Øpallaktik») apparently unparalleled in st£sij-theory tends to 
confirm an Athenaean provenance for the relevant scholia. However, in view of 
the changes in terminology, Athenaeus himself is unlikely to be the source. One of 
these changes may reflect the influence of Caecilius treatment of figures; but he, 
too, cannot be the source since his own theory of st£sij had an incompatible 
structure. There appears to be no way of determining more closely who was 
responsible for the modification of Athenaeus scheme, or who applied it to 
Homer.
10
   
II 
The references to st£sij-theory in the scholia are, with one exception, 
suppressed by Eustathius, despite his extensive use of other branches of rhetoric in 
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 G. Lehnert, De scholiis ad Homerum rhetoricis (Leipzig 1896), 104-6 and H. Schrader, Hermes 
37 (1902), 530-81 (see esp. 564-5), propose Telephus of Pergamum, on whom see C. Wendel, RE 
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elucidating Homer.
11
 One reason for this may have been the unfamiliarity of the 
terms used to one trained (as Eustathius would have been) in the Hermogenean 
tradition. But there was also an element of literary judgement. When he introduces 
the figure met£lhyij (79.11-12 Stallbaum = 125.10-12 van der Valk), Eustathius 
distinguishes it from the st£sij of that name (the sense the term has in political 
rhetors), which would be disagreeable (duscer»j) in poetry.12 On the one 
occasion where Eustathius does apply st£sij-theory (415.23-41 = 653.3-25; 
434.32-40 = 683.21-31) he is discussing the dispute which could, but in the event 
does not, arise after the duel between Paris and Menelaus; and he observes that 
Homer uses Pandarus breach of the truce to avoid legal arguments which would 
slacken tension (†na m¾... dikanik¦ parene…rV kai ¢neimšnhn t¾n po…hsin 
¢perg£shtai kaˆ cal£sV tÕ sÚntonon). The discussion below might be 
thought to confirm Eustathius literary judgement on this point. It is striking, 
however, that on this one occasion when Eustathius does apply st£sij-theory to 
Homer he disagrees with the scholia.  
First, the context. At Il. 3.67-75 Paris issues a challenge to Menelaus on the 
basis that the victor will take Helen and the property; Hector conveys the 
challenge to the Greeks in the same terms (86-94; cf. Idaeus at 255). When 
Menelaus accepts the challenge he assumes that one of them will be killed (101-
2); and when Agamemnon formulates the oath used to confirm the truce he says 
that whichever party kills the other will take Helen and the property (281-7). But 
in the event Paris, though beaten, is rescued from death by Aphrodite; and 
Agamemnon claims Helen and the property for Menelaus on the basis of his 
victory (456-60). As Eustathius observes, Pandarus breach of the truce forestalls 
any explicit Trojan response to this claim.
13
   
According to the scholia, the issue of the dispute is one of letter and intent 
(3.457 kaˆ g…netai ¹ st£sij ·htÕn kaˆ di£noia); by contrast Eustathius 
identifies it as ¢ntinom…a (415.33 = 653.15; 434.37 = 683.27). The problem is 
discussed as an instance of ¢ntinom…a in Plutarchs Quaestiones Convivales 
(9.13), a work with which Eustathius was closely familiar;
14
 but why has he 
chosen to abandon the scholia in favour of Plutarch at this point?  
Two features of the discussion in the scholia offer prima facie support for 
Eustathius decision. The note to 3.457 speaks of the Trojans invoking the support 
of Agamemnons words, the Greeks of Hectors; this satisfies Hermogenes 
definition of ¢ntinom…a precisely: ¨n mān oân perˆ žn ·htÕn ¹ z»thsij... ·htÕn 
kaˆ di£noia g…netai... (40.6-8), e„ mšntoi perˆ dÚo ·ht¦... ¹ z»thsij e‡h, 
¢ntinom…a g…netai (40.20-41.1). Moreover, the comment in the scholion to 3.281-
7 that the Trojans have the better of the argument Óti m£lista de‹ Ðr©n t¦ ™pˆ 
to‹j Órkoij ÐrizÒmena is lame if the issue is whether to follow the letter or the 
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 See M. van der Valk, Eustathii Commentaria ad Homeri Iliadem pertinentes (Leiden 1971-87), 
I.xcii-c, II.li-lxx. 
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 For the association of st£sij-theory with political rhetoric see Hermogenes 28.10-14 Rabe. 
13
 For a more recent commentary on this sequence see G.S. Kirks notes on 3.281-7, 306-7, 457. 
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spirit of the oath (being in that case either trivially true or question-begging), but 
fits perfectly as a move in the relative evaluation of the challenge and the oath.
15
  
But these are relatively superficial points. More fundamentally, the st£sij 
cannot be determined without identifying the question in dispute. There are two 
possibilities. If the question is whether the Trojans break their oath in failing to 
return Helen, the st£sij is indeed ·htÕn kaˆ di£noia. The Trojans would insist 
on the conditions made explicit in the oath, while the Greeks would argue that 
Menelaus victory satisfies its implied conditions; the terms of Paris challenge 
would be invoked only as evidence that the oaths explicit reference to killing 
implicitly embraced other kinds of victory. However, if the question is simply who 
has best claim to Helen and the property, the Greeks could argue that the Trojans 
areas it werelegally bound to return Helen by the terms of their challenge and 
the fact of its acceptance, even though they are not strictly speaking under oath to 
do so.
16
 In that case, both challenge and oath are of primary relevance, and the 
st£sij is ¢ntinom…a. The scholion in question is commenting on a speech in 
which Agamemnon appeals to the terms of the challenge in order to establish a 
claim to Helen, making no reference to the oath as such. The second way of 
construing the question therefore seems more apposite.  
Eustathius, then, is justified in departing from the scholia. For the scholia 
seem to offer a correct analysis of a question (are the Trojans breaking their oath?) 
which is not posed by the lines on which they are commenting, but an incorrect 
analysis of the more immediately relevant question (who has best claim to 
Helen?). This suggests the possibility that the reference to ·htÕn kaˆ di£noia 
originated in some context other than a commentary on this passage. An obvious 
alternative context is a zetema on the prima facie inconsistency between the terms 
of the oath and subsequent claims that the oath has been broken (especially by 
Antenor at 7.351-2). We know from Porphyrys Quaestiones Homericae (59.35-
60.16 Schrader) that this problem had been discussed as least as early as 
Aristotle.
17
 For a later rhetorician the use of st£sij-theory to resolve the difficulty 
                                                 
15
 This agrees with Hermogenes treatment of the heading prÒj ti in ¢ntinom…a at 87.2-9 (contrast 
83.15-16 on the same heading in ·htÕn kaˆ di£noia, wherenaturallythere is no comparison of 
two legal instruments, only of two actions). Plutarch uses the point in this way at QC 742d-e. 
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œmoige doke‹ mhd' ¢ntinomikÕn gegonšnai tÕ z»thma, ta‹j deutšraij Ðmolog…aij tîn 
prètwn ™mperiecomšnwn. The speakers point here is not of course that the st£sij is something 
other than ¢ntinom…a, but that the dispute is decisively settled by this argument (diversionary 
tactics, for the argument is flawed). 
16
 Cf. the pro-Greek speaker at Plutarch QC 742b, where I presume the point is not that 
Agamemnons oath is invalid per se, but that it does not supersede the terms of the challenge since 
the Greeks, in accepting the Trojan challenge, had no power to vary its terms; this partys version 
of perišcon kaˆ periecÒmenon (see previous note) would therefore be that the terms of the 
challenge can retain their validity without annulling the oath. The heading prÒj ti is supplied by 
the argument that the claim of the victor is intrinsically more just than that of the killer (742b-d). 
17
 Aristotle observes (fr.148 Rose) that the poet nowhere states that the Trojans broke the oath; but 
he argues that the Trojans are nevertheless subject to the curse invoked at 3.298-301 on those who 
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would be an obvious step; and, as we have seen, an appeal to ·htÕn kaˆ di£noia 
is the correct solution to the problem thus posed.  
 
merely injure (phm»neian) the oath: oÙk ™pièrkhsan mān oân, ™kakoÚrghsan kaˆ œblayen 
toÝj Órkouj: ™p£ratoi oân Ãsan. 
